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I. INTRODUCTION
Early in November of 1986, newspapers in the United States carried
the first reports that the United States government, in an effort to
gain release of United States citizens held hostage by terrorists in
Lebanon, had engaged in a covert policy of supplying arms to elements
within Iran.' Later in that month, following a preliminary inquiry
into the matter, it was revealed that some of the funds generated
from those arms sales had been diverted to support the "Contra"
forces fighting the Sandinista government in Nicaragua. 2
The events giving rise to these disclosures became known collectively
as the "Iran-Contra Affair." Both elements of the affair raised serious
questions regarding the formulation and conduct of our nation's
foreign policy. In regard to the Iranian phase of the affair, the Regan
administration's rhetoric had placed the administration firmly in op-
position to any dealings with nations supporting terrorism, and with
Iran in particular.' In addition, the United States had made significant
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LL.B., University of Georgia Law School, 1959. In 1987, Congressman Jenkins
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I See Washington Post, Nov. 4, 1986, at A-15, col. 1; N.Y. Times, Nov. 4,
1986, at Al, col. 4. The first reports of an arms for hostages deal originated in a
Lebanese weekly magazine, Ash-Shiraa. Ash-Shiraa reported that Robert McFarlane,
then national security advisor to President Reagan, traveled to Tehran, Iran to
discuss with Iranian officials a cessation of that country's support for terrorist groups
in exchange for the United States provision of spare parts for Iran's United States-
made military equipment. Id.
2 See 22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1604-05 (Nov. 25, 1986).
See, e.g., Remarks at American Bar Association Annual Convention, July 8,
1985, 21 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 876 (July 15, 1985) (Iran, Libya, North Korea,
Cuba and Nicaragua constitute "a core group of radical and totalitarian governments
- a new, international version of Murder, Incorporated . . . united by one simple,
criminal phenomenon - their fanatical hatred of the United States, our people, our
way of life, our international stature.")
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efforts to cut the flow of arms to Iran to be used in the ongoing
Iran-Iraq war by placing diplomatic pressure on other nations to halt
arms sales, seizing American military equipment destined for Iran,
and making numerous arrests for violations of arms-export laws. 4
In the "Contra" aspect of the affair, military aid to the Nicaraguan
rebels had been a subject of fierce contention between the Admin-
istration and the Congress for several years. This fundamental policy
disagreement culminated in a series of legislatively-mandated limi-
tations on United States government assistance to the rebels.5 As a
result, the Iran-Contra revelations precipitated inquiries, unprece-
dented both in their scope and their openness, into the formulation
and implementation of United States foreign policy. In addition to
investigations by the press and various groups of private citizens,
Attorney General Edwin Meese, III announced on December 2, 1986
that his preliminary investigation of the affair had determined that
a possible violation of criminal laws might have occurred; as a result,
he sought the appointment of an independent counsel. 6
The executive and legislative branches undertook the most far-
reaching investigations of the Iran-Contra affair. The day after the
disclosure of the Contra diversion, the President created a "Special
Review Board" and directed it to "conduct a comprehensive study
of the future role and procedures of the National Security Council
staff in the development, coordination, oversight, and conduct of
4 See R. PREECE, THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR: IMPLICATIONS FOR U.S. POLICY 15 (Con-
gressional Research Service No. 1B84016, 1987).
1 See Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1983, Pub. L. No. 97-377,
§ 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982) (enacted in Further Continuing Appropriations Act,
1983) ("None of the funds provided in this Act may be used by the Central Intelligence
Agency or the Department of Defense to furnish military equipment, military training
or advice, or other support for military activities, to any group or individual not
part of a country's armed forces, for the purpose of overthrowing the government
of Nicaragua or providing a military exchange between Nicaragua and Honduras.");
Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775, 97
Stat. 1421 (1983) ($24 million cap on funds to agencies involved in intelligence
gathering activities for operations concerning Nicaragua); Department of Defense
Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066, 98 Stat. 1935 (1984) (enacted
in Continuing Appropriations Act, 1985) (No funds to agencies involved in intelligence
gathering activities for operations concerning Nicaragua without the filing of a
presidential report and congressional joint resolution approving such aid.)
6 See 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 3013 (Dec. 6, 1986). On December 19, 1986,
Lawrence E. Walsh, a former United States district judge, diplomat and deputy
attorney general was named as the independent counsel to investigate the Iran-Contra
affair. See 44 Cong. Q. Weekly Rep. 3095 (Dec. 20, 1986).
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foreign and national security policy." 7 He named former Senator
John Tower, former Senator and Secretary of State Edmund Muskie,
and former Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Brent Scowcroft to serve as members of the board.8 The panel,
referred to as the "Tower Commission" after its chairman, submitted
a report to the President on February 26, 1987. 9
In addition to the Executive branch investigation, in early 1987
both Houses of Congress created select committees to investigate the
Iran-Contra affair. The Senate established the Select Committee on
Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition' °
on January 6, and on the following day, the House of Representatives
established the Select Committee to Investigate Covert Arms Trans-
actions with Iran." The two chambers ultimately combined their
efforts through joint investigations and hearings and the issuance of
a joint report. 12
The dominant theme emerging from these investigations is the
question of accountability for the formulation and execution of for-
eign policy within the Executive Branch: Who is to be responsible
for conducting such activities, and who is to be held responsible -
before the nation and its elected representatives - for the outcome?
The Iran-Contra affair has once again focused attention on the dec-
ades-old contest for power between competing Executive Branch bu-
22 WEEKLY COMP. PREs. Doc. 1605 (Nov. 26, 1986). The Special Review Board
was officially established in accordance with the Federal Advisory Committee Act
(5 U.S.C. app. I) by Executive Order 12,575 dated December 1, 1986.
Id.
Report of the President's Special Review Board (Feb. 26, 1987) [hereinafter
cited as Tower Report].
,o S. Res. 23, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. S100 (daily ed. Jan. 6,
1987). Members of the Senate Committee included Senators Daniel K. Inouye (Chair-
man), Warren Rudman (Vice Chairman), George J. Mitchell, Sam Nunn, Paul S.
Sarbanes, Howell T. Heflin, David L. Boren, James A. McClure, Orrin G. Hatch,
William S. Cohen, and Paul S. Trible, Jr.
" H. Res. 12, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REc. H123 (daily ed. Jan. 7,
1987). Members of the House Committee included Lee H. Hamilton (Chairman),
Dante B. Fascell (Vice Chairman), Thomas S. Foley, Peter W. Rodino, Jr., Jack
Brooks, Louis Stokes, Les Aspin, Edward P. Boland, Ed Jenkins, Dick Cheney
(Ranking Republican), Wm. S. Broomfield, Henry J. Hyde, Jim Courter, Bill
McCollum, and Michael DeWine.
12 HousE SELECT COMM. TO INVESTIGATE COVERT ARMS TRANSACTIONS WITH IRAN
& SENATE SELECT COMM. ON SECRET MILITARY ASSISTANCE TO IRAN AND THE Ni-
CARAGUAN OPPOSITION, REPORT OF THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES INVESTIGATING
THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR, H.R. REP. No. 433, S. REP. No. 216, 100th Cong., 1st
Sess. (1987) [hereinafter cited as CONGRESSIONAL REPORT].
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reaucracies: on the one hand, the staff of the National Security
Council (NSC) and its working head, the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs; and on the other, the cabinet-level
departments, particularly the Department of State. The record of the
affair also shows the extraordinary latitude under which the Reagan
administration permitted the NSC to function, and it demonstrates
the serious consequences that can flow from placing authority for
the direct conduct of foreign policy initiatives in the hands of in-
dividuals who lack both visibility and accountability: the NSC staff.
II. THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL - ORIGIN AND
BACKGROUND
Congress created the National Security Council through the Na-
tional Security Act of 1947.13 In the years immediately following
World War II, a consensus formed around the proposition that the
need existed for changes in the organization of the United States
overall national security structure - including military forces, supply,
national security policy planning, and intelligence. The legislative
vehicle for this reorganizational drive became H.R. 2319, as intro-
duced by Congressman Clare E. Hoffman of Michigan, Chairman
of the House Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Depart-
ments, in the first session of the Eightieth Congress on February 28,
1947.14
The legislation's proposal for the establishment of a National Se-
curity Council to provide coordination and liaison on national security
matters reflected the experience of World War II. Various working
arrangements effectuated to meet the exigencies of that period pro-
vided the precedent for a high-level policy coordination and advisory
mechanism. A Standing Liaison Committee, created in 1938 at the
instigation of Secretary of State Cordell Hull to concentrate on Latin
American issues, consisted of the Under Secretary of State, the Army
Chief of Staff, and the Chief of Naval Operations.' 5 Other proto-
'1 National Security Act of 1947, ch. 343, 61 Stat. 495 (1947). The portion of
the National Security Act creating the NSC is codified at 50 U.S.C. § 401.
'4 93 CONG. REc. 1579 (1947). The committee held 20 days of hearings concerning
the proposal between April and July of 1947. See National Security Act of 1947:
Hearings Before the Comm. on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, 80th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1947) [hereinafter 1947 Hearings]. The Committee on Expenditures
in the Executive Departments was renamed the Committee on Government Operations
in 1952. See H.R. Res. 647, 82d Cong., 2d Sess. (1952).
1S M. LOWENTHAL, THE NATIONAL SECURITY COUNcIL: ORGANIZATIONAL HISTORY,
CRS-5 (Congressional Research Service No. 78-104F, 1987).
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typical coordinating entities included the National Defense Advisory
Council, composed of private citizens with specific areas of profes-
sional expertise, and the State, War, Navy Coordinating Committee,
created near the end of the war consisting of the assistant secretaries
of those departments. 16
The record of the hearings on H.R. 2319 makes clear that military
reorganization constituted the legislation's primary purpose. The leg-
islation sought to create a unified military command to replace the
existing Calinet-level Departments of War and Navy. Secretary of
War Robert P. Patterson, the lead Administration witness at the
hearings, supported the restructuring of the military command frame-
work into a "National Defense Establishment." The bill provided
that the new National Defense Establishment consist of the Depart-
ments of the Army, Navy, and Air Force, and be headed by an
official referred to in that version of the legislation as the Secretary
of National Defense. 17
Clearly, the bill's originators viewed the creation of an advisory
and coordinating entity like the National Security Council as a sec-
ondary concern of the legislation. Patterson's testimony described
creation of a National Security Council almost as an afterthought. 18
The function of this proposed council would be to "advise the
President on integration of foreign and military policies and to enable
the military services and other agencies to cooperate more effectively
in matters relative to National Defense."' 19
Other witnesses on H.R. 2319 also discussed the NSC principally
in its military context. Secretary of the Navy James Forrestal described
the proposed entity exclusively in terms of improving military op-
erations: "an instrument for effective and frequent coordination be-
tween our national policy and our military potential. '20 Similarly,
Vice Admiral Forrest Sherman, the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations,
referred to "the necessity for an organization . . . to make decisions
16 Id. at CRS-5-CRS-8.
11 1947 Hearings, supra note 14, at 11.
,1 Id. The legislation proposed that the National Security Council consist of the
Secretary of State, the Secretary of National Defense, the Secretaries of Army, Navy,
and Air Force, the Chairman of the National Security Resources Board, and such
other members as the President might appoint. Id.
'1 Id. The legislation also proposed to create the Central Intelligence Agency to
operated under the Council and to replace the previously existing Central Intelligence
Group. Id.
20 Id. at 99.
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based on sound estimates as to the most effective manner in which
our military and financial resources can be applied." 2'
Possibly because of the National Security Council's position as a
minor concern to the Act's drafters in relation to the overall purpose
of the legislation, the NSC's structure in final form22 conformed
almost identically to the form proposed in H.R. 2319. The enacted
law described the NSC's function as "[advising] the President with
respect to the integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies
relating to the national security so as to enable the military services
and the other departments and agencies of the Government to co-
operate more effectively in matters involving the national security. 23
The legislation directed that the Council be composed of the President;
the Secretaries of State, Defense, Army, Navy, and the Air Force;
the chairman of the National Security Resources Board; and other
specified officials if designated by the President. 24 In addition to an
open-ended clause directing it to perform "such other functions as
the President may direct," 25 the NSC had the following specific duties:
(1) to assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks
of the United States in relation to our actual and potential military
power, in the interest of national security, for the purpose of making
recommendations to the President in connection therewith; and
(2) to consider policies on matters of common interest to the de-
partments and agencies of the Government concerned with the na-
tional security, and to make recommendations to the President in
connection therewith. 26
The language establishing the NSC thus demonstrates that its cre-
ators envisioned it as a source of advice, rather than operational
activity. The language also shows that this advice was to come from
the Cabinet-level officials designated as NSC members, rather than
from NSC staff: The Act's only mention of a staff function was a
brief provision for "a staff to be headed by a civilian executive
secretary who shall be appointed by the President .... The executive
secretary, subject to the direction of the Council, is hereby authorized
21 Id. at 165.
22 National Security Act of 1947, ch 343, § 101, 61 Stat. 495 (1947) (presently
codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402 (1982)).
Id. at § 101(a) (presently codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402(a)(1982)).
24 Id.
25 Id. at § 101(b) (presently codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402(b)(1982)).
26 Id.
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S.. to appoint and fix the compensation of such personnel as may
be necessary to perform such duties as may be prescribed by the
Council in connection with the performance of its functions. 2 7
In response to recommendations of the Hoover Commission,2 8
Congress statutorily altered the membership of the NSC in 194929
and in addition to its new composition, the NSC formally became
part of the Executive Office of the President in that year.3 0
III. THE NSC UNDER PREVIOUS PRESIDENTS
The role of the National Security Council and its staff in foreign
policy formulation and implementation through the past eight pres-
idencies has been the product of the interplay of a number of factors:
the individual President's working relationship with the NSC and
other national security officials (particularly the Secretary of State);
the degree to which the President desired to take personal control
of foreign policy machinery; and the assertiveness of the NSC head
in seeking to exercise control over foreign policy processes.
Harry Truman, President at the time of the National Security Act's
passage, employed the NSC as an entity to promote discussion and
synthesis of policy options and to thereafter forward its recommen-
dations to him. After chairing the first NSC meeting in September
of 1947, Truman left that task to the Secretary of State and later
to the Vice President, attending only 11 of the 56 weekly NSC meetings
prior to the beginning of the Korean War.3 The responsibility for
forwarding to the President the policy recommendations that the
group arrived at, along with the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
fell upon the NSC's first Executive Secretary, Sidney Souers.3 2
Dean Acheson, Truman's Secretary of State from 1949 to 1953,
praised the NSC structure for its role in facilitating orderly foreign
27 Id. at § 101(c) (presently codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402(c) (1982)).
28 THE COMMSSION ON ORGANIZATION OF THE ExEcUTVE BRANCH OF THE Gov-
ERNMENT, GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH (1949).
29 National Security Act Amendments of 1949, ch. 412, § 3, 63 Stat. 579 (1949).
The 1949 Amendments altered the membership of the NSC by adding the Vice
President to the Council and removing the secretaries of the military departments.
Id. In addition, the Amendments authorized the President to add, with the consent
of the Senate, to the Council's membership the Chairmen of the Munitions Board
and the Research and Development Board as well as the secretaries and under
secretaries of other executive and military departments. Id.
30 Reorganization Plan No., 4, 1949.
3, Melbourne, Odyssey of the NSC, 11 STRATEGIC REv. 51, 52 (1983).
32 Id.
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policy decisionmaking by high-level members of the Administration.
Acheson posited that the NSC carried out this role effectively because
its meetings were limited to principals, with "aides and briefcase-
carriers . . . excluded;33 Cabinet-level participants came to the meet-
ings prepared to argue their case on the basis of previously submitted
memoranda." 3 4
Truman's successor, Dwight Eisenhower, created the position of
"Special Assistant for National Security Affairs" (generally referred
to as the National Security Advisor) to represent his personal per-
spective within the NSC bureaucracy. Robert Cutler, a former Ei-
senhower campaign aide, filled the newly-created position, acting as
the President's liaison to the NSC while the executive secretary took
responsibility over the NSC's career staff.35 Cutler's role was that of
a "coordinator . . . the President's assistant in charge of the NSC
rather than national security policy." '3 6 The responsibility for the
latter role rested with the Secretary of State during most of the
Eisenhower presidency, John Foster Dulles. 37
The contemporary dominant role of the NSC staff in the for-
mulation and execution of foreign policy can be said to date from
the administration of John F. Kennedy. The ponderous nature of
the State Department's decisionmaking process reportedly dissatisfied
President Kennedy because, "with his temperament and impatience
for results, [he] found the State Department an uncongenial element
in his national security structure. ' 38 Kennedy turned to his National
Security Advisor, McGeorge Bundy, to fashion a "mini-State De-
partment" that could provide foreign policy analysis and options
quickly. 9
As a result of his dissatisfaction, Kennedy dismantled the elaborate
NSC bureaucratic structure that had built up under the previous
administration, and "replaced Eisenhower's balanced, cumbersome-
13 D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION: MY YEARS IN THE STATE DEPARTMENT
733 (1969).
34 Id.
3S 1. DESTLER, L. GELB, & A. LAKE, OUR OWN WORST ENEMY: THE UNMAKING
OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 172 (1984).
36 J. WOLDMAN, U.S. PRESIDENTIAL NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISERS: CHANGING
ROLES AND RELATIONSHIPS CRS-4 (Congressional Research Service Report No. 87-
334F, 1987) (quoting Nelson, The "Top of Policy Hill". President Eisenhower and
the National Security Council, DIPLOMATIC HISTORY, 313 (Fall 1983)).
37 Id.
38 Melbourne, supra note 31, at 56.
39 D. HALBERSTAM, THE BEST AND THE BRIGHTEST 62 (1969).
[Vol. 18:19
THE NSC AND THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
looking policy-making system with one that was overtly and aggres-
sively informal, personal, fluid, focused on the here-and-now." 4 The
NSC staff, under Bundy's direction, "came to be a White House
staff to shape foreign policy decisions by other than formal Council
procedures." 41
Bundy remained as National Security Advisor under Lyndon John-
son until Walt Rostow succeeded him in 1966. While retaining the
outline of the Kennedy NSC structure, Johnson worked more through
Cabinet secretaries - particularly through the device of weekly meet-
ings (so-called "Tuesday lunches") whose participants included the
President, the Secretaries of State and Defense, the National Security
Advisor, the Director of Central Intelligence, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and other officials as the weekly topic might
dictate. 42
Richard Nixon came to the Presidency in 1969 determined to con-
solidate the direction of foreign policy in the White House. 43 Nixon's
first National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger, quickly adapted the
NSC system into a powerful mechanism to centralize the control of
foreign policy formulation and execution. As National Security Ad-
visor, Kissinger assumed the role of United States negotiator with
foreign countries, including Vietnam, China, and the Soviet Union
- a role traditionally within the province of the Secretary of State."
Ratification of Kissinger's preeminence came early in Nixon's second
term when he became the only individual ever to hold the positions
of White House National Security Advisor and Secretary of State
simultaneously. These dual roles continued into the Ford adminis-
tration, until Kissinger's former deputy, Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft,
became National Security Advisor. Under Jimmy Carter's presidency,
National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski served as a source of
information and new foreign policy initiatives, with resulting tension
between Brzezinski and the Secretary of State. 45
40 I. DESTLER, L. GELB, & A. LAKE, supra note 35, at 193.
41 Melbourne, supra note 31, at 55.
42 INSTITUTE FOR DEFENSE ANALYSIS, THE PRESIDENT AND THE MANAGEMENT OF
NATIONAL SECURITY 88-89 (K. Clark & L. Legere eds. 1969).
41 J. WOLDMAN, supra note 36, at 25 (citing R. NIXON, RN, THE MEMOIRS OF
RICHARD NIXON, 340 (1978)). Henry Kissinger, President Nixon's Secretary State
and National Security Advisor, wrote that President Nixon considered the State
Department untrustworthy and the CIA incompetent and as a result the National
Security Advisor "was crucial to him and to his plan to run foreign policy from
the White House." H. KISSINGER, THE WHITE HOUSE YEARS 13 (1979).
" Tower Report, supra note 9, at 11-2.
45 Id.
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IV. NSC's ROLE IN THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
In 1984, Robert C. McFarlane, then the Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs, referring to the role of the National
Security Council in the Reagan Presidency, wrote:
President Reagan rejected the idea that the NSC system should
dominate the policy process. Instead, he feels that cabinet depart-
ments and agencies concerned with the four principal aspects of
security policy - diplomatic, military, economic, and intelligence
affairs - should play the lead role in policy development. Although
an NSC-centered system can be very responsive to a president's
desires, the alternative, a cabinet government, ensures that the Pres-
ident is not isolated from political and institutional realities. The
departments are better able to broaden the spectrum of options and
to integrate the concerns of diverse organizational and political
constituencies than is any White House staff arrangement.46
McFarlane, who occupied the position of National Security Advisor
as the initial stages of the Iran-Contra affair unfolded, thus made
the case for following the exact sort of process that the Iran-Contra
affair circumvented. By indirection, he outlined the consequences that
would flow from concentration of the decision-making process in the
NSC staff: isolation of the President from political and institutional
realities, failure to measure the "spectrum of opinions" that might
be held on a particular issue by different officials, and an inability
to recognize the broader concerns that would be brought to the table
by diverse constituencies. The defects of centering power in the NSC
staff became even more apparent, and the consequences more acute,
as the staff assumed operational control over both assistance to the
Contras and supply of arms to Iran.
The NSC Staff and Contra Assistance
Support for the Contra forces fighting the leftist Sandinista gov-
ernment in Nicaragua became a policy of the Reagan administration
from its first months in 1981. Operating under authority of presi-
dentially-approved intelligence "findings," and using funds appro-
priated by the Congress for that purpose, the Central Intelligence
4 McFarlane, The National Security Council: Organization for Policy Making,
in 5 CENTER FOR THE STUDY OF THE PRESIDENCY, THE PRESIDENCY AND NATIONAL
SECURITY POLICY 261, 264-65 (1984).
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Agency (CIA) initially assumed responsibility for providing the Con-
tras with arms and other supplies. 47
The legislative branch, however, did not fully share the executive's
commitment to the Contra cause. Through successive legislative man-
dates, generally attached as riders to appropriations bills, Congress
imposed a series of limitations on the amount and type of assistance
which it authorized the United States government to provide to the
Contras. Late in 1982, Congress explicitly prohibited the CIA and
the Department of Defense (DOD) from furnishing "military equip-
ment, military training or advice, or other support for military ac-
tivities . . . for the purpose of overthrowing the Government of
Nicaragua." '4 8 One year later, Congress placed a $24 million ceiling
on military support for the Contras.4 9 In October of 1984, following
the disclosure earlier that year that the CIA had participated in mining
Nicaraguan harbors, Congress prohibited the expenditure of funds
by the CIA, DOD, or "any other agency or entity of the United
States involved in intelligence activities ... for the purpose or which
would have the effect of supporting, directly or indirectly, military
or paramilitary operations in Nicaragua by any nation, group, or-
ganization, movement, or individual." 50 In floor debate on the 1984
amendment, Congressman Boland, sponsor of the amendments, de-
clared that the provision "clearly ends U.S. support for the war in
Nicaragua. Such support can only be renewed if the President can
convince the Congress that this very strict prohibition should be
overturned.""
Despite this expression of Congressional disapproval, the Reagan
administration remained determined to maintain support for the Con-
tras - in the words of former National Security Advisor McFarlane,
to "help them hold body and soul together ' 5 2 - until such time as
41 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 3.
41 Defense Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 793, 96 Stat. 1865 (1982)
(enacted in Further Continuing Appropriations Act, 1983).
49 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-212, § 775,
97 Stat. 1452 (1983).
10 Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 1985, Pub. L. No. 98-473, § 8066,
98 Stat. 1935 (1984) (enacted as part of Continuing Appropriations Act, 1985). The
so-called "Boland Amendment" bore the name of Congressman Edward Boland of
Massachusetts, a member of the Appropriations Committee and former chairman
of the House Select Committee on Intelligence, who sponsored the amendments.
1' 130 CONG. REC. H11980 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1984).
32 Testimony of Robert C. McFarlane, Gaston J. Sigur, Jr., and Robert W. Owen:
Joint Hearings Before the House Select Committee. to Investigate Covert Arms
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the Congress could be persuaded to resume active support of the
Contras. Pursuant to this general objective, the National Security
Council staff, under the direction of Lt. Col. Oliver North, began
conducting all operational aspects of Contra assistance.
In order to provide the financial resources that had been denied
by the Congressional cut-off of funding, the NSC staff sought con-
tributions from two unorthodox sources: foreign nations and private
United States citizens. According to the Congressional committees'
report, foreign governments contributed $34 million to the Contra
effort between June of 1984 and early 1986, with an additional $2.7
million solicited from private citizens.53 At the beginning of the Contra
support operation those funds were deposited in accounts controlled
by Contra leaders. After mid-1985, however, two private citizens,
Richard Secord and Albert Hakim, administered the funds through
bank accounts under their control. Secord and Hakim's "Enterprise,"
as they referred to the operation, received contributions and disbursed
funds out of a series of Swiss shell companies and bank accounts,
took charge of weapons purchases for the Contras, and, in later
phases of the effort, assumed responsibility for running the weapons
and logistical material resupply operation.14
The NSC Staff and the Iran Hostages/Arms Initiative
The NSC staff's activities on behalf of the Contras first paralleled
and then became intertwined with its operational role of supplying
arms to elements within Iran in an effort to secure the release of
American hostages held captive in Lebanon. In mid-1985, according
to the Congressional Report, the Israeli government proposed a plan
whereby missiles would be sold to the government of Iran in exchange
for Iranian intercession to secure the release of American citizens
held hostage in Lebanon and the possibility of an improved long-
term relationship between Iran and the United States." The plan
gained approval over the objections of the Secretaries of State and
Defense, who disputed the likelihood of being able to establish contact
Transactions with Iran and Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance
to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1987) (Testimony
of Robert C. McFarlane, May 11, 1987) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Hearings].
" CONtGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 4; see also id. at 69-71 (support
from foreign governments); id. at 85-101 (support from private citizens).
14 Id. at 4; see also id. at 327-59 (Congressional findings on the role and operations
of "the Enterprise").
11 Tower Report, supra note 9, at B-8-B-9.
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with any "moderate" elements within the Iranian government 6 and
who argued that trading weapons for hostages would contravene
United States policy and violate the Arms Export Control Act.57
Under the leadership of Colonel North, members of the NSC staff
already involved in the Contra assistance effort became responsible
for implementing the operational details of the United States gov-
ernment's involvement in the Iran weapons supply program.58 In
addition, the private citizens in control of the "Enterprise" assumed
control over the financial brokering of the weapons transactions. 9
Several Israeli arms sales to Iran during the remainder of 1985
netted the return of only one American hostage. 6° (One such trans-
action, however, did net the "Enterprise" $800,000 in spare cash,
which Colonel North directed be retained and spent for the Contras
- thus beginning the "diversion". 61) During December of 1985, in
the face of the apparent failure of the program to achieve its goals
and the continued objections of the Secretaries of State and Defense,
outgoing National Security Advisor McFarlane recommended that the
sales to Iran be halted. The President, however, sided with his new
National Security Advisor, Admiral John Poindexter, and CIA Di-
rector William Casey, who favored the continuation of the arms sales.
Continuing the strategy of selling arms to Iran, the President, in
January of 1986, authorized direct sales of weapons from the United
States to Iran. 62
Between February and October of 1986, the NSC staff directed
repeated sales of weapons by the United States government through
the "Enterprise" to the government of Iran.63 The result of these
activities, however, secured the release of only one additional United
States hostage. In addition, the United States gained no other apparent
56 Id. The Secretary of Defense initially characterized the proposal as "absurd"
and said that attempting to develop new links with Iranian leaders "is roughly like
inviting Qadhafi over for a cozy lunch." Id.
17 Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (1982).
"' CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 6-7.
59 Id.
60 Id. at 7. The United States authorized Israel to sell 100 TOW missiles to Iran
through an Iranian born arms dealer, Manucher Ghorbanifar. Id. at 169. While the
first shipment of TOW missiles netted no hostages, a second shipment of 400
additional missiles secured the release of one United States hostage, the Reverend
Benjamin Weir. Id. at 168-69.
61 Id. at 7; see also id. at 179.
62 Id. at 7; see also id. at 193-97.
63 See Tower Report, supra note 9 at B-180-B-185.
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benefits, such as any evidence of an improved relationship with the
government of Iran, as a result of the continuing sales. In an attempt
to improve contacts with responsive elements within Iran, Albert
Hakim opened a "Second Channel" in September and October of
1986. 64 With the exposure of the Iran arms transactions in November
of 1986, however, and the subsequent revelation that part of the
proceeds of those transactions had been diverted to support the
Contras, the NSC staff's operations came to an end.
V. SoME LESSONS OF THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR
United States Foreign Policy Activities Must Be Internally Consistent
In order to avoid the disapproval of entities that would normally
have had knowledge of national security operations (including the
Congress, the State and Defense Departments, and the CIA), in both
the Iran and Contra activities the NSC staff bypassed the normal
institutional framework for conducting such operations and substi-
tuted processes that were largely ad hoc and unregulated. One by-
product resulting from this action was a high degree of inconsistency,
both in rhetoric and in substance. The most obvious example of this
inconsistency is shown by the United States dealings with Iran: at
the same time the United States publicly proclaimed both its oppo-
sition to nations supporting terrorism and its neutrality in a regional
conflict, the NSC staff carried out a program of supplying weapons
to a terrorist state involved in that conflict.
During the Contra phase of the affair, this same inconsistency
between stated purpose and actual execution became apparent. Colo-
nel North declared the promotion of democracy in Central America
to be the purpose of the covert Contra assistance effort;65 in internal
documents he referred to the undertaking as "Project Democracy," 66
and asserted that the foreign governments asked to aid the Contras
were willing to supply such assistance because they were more com-
mitted to promoting the cause of democracy in Central America than
Id. at 8-9. The "Second Channel" opened by Hakim worked through an
Iranian revolutionary guardsman (The "Relative") to the Iranian Government. Id.
at 249.
65 See Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 4 (testimony of Oliver L. North,
July 9, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
- See CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 72-73.
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the United States Congress. 67 Yet, not one of the solicited countries
that ultimately provided funding for the Contras had a democratic
form of government; indeed, the totalitarian character of a number
of those governments was beyond dispute. 6
The NSC staff purposefully excluded the major elements of de-
mocracy within the United States government, namely, elected of-
ficials and Cabinet-level appointed officials who by virtue of their
confirmation by the Senate were bound to be available for testimony
'before the Congress, from knowledge of the private Contra funding
process. The legislative branch of the government received no infor-
mation at all concerning the Iranian arms program, and participants
structured the arms sales in such a way as to circumvent legislatively
mandated Congressional notification requirements. 69 Yet, at the same
time the NSC staff withheld information from the legislative branch
and high-level executive branch officials (including statutory members
of the National Security Council such as the Secretary of Defense,
the Secretary of State, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff), ostensibly to
preserve the security of the initiative, the NSC staff shared that
information with a host of other, clearly less trustworthy figures:
-Manucher Ghorbanifar, who flunked every polygraph test ad-
ministered by the U.S. Government;
-Iranian officials, who daily denounced the United States but
received an inscribed Bible from the President;
-Officials of Iran's Revolutionary Guard, who received the U.S.
weapons;
-Secord and Hakim, whose personal interests could conflict with
the interests of the United States;
-Israeli officials, international arms merchants, pilots and air crews,
67 Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 77 (testimony of Oliver L. North,
July 7, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
61 See id. at 13. The specific list of solicited countries referred to by Mr. Jenkins
during the Congressional hearings was contained in a memorandum to the members
of the Committees and Witnesses, dated July 7, 1987, attaching identifying numbers
to nine foreign countries. This numbering system, devised pursuant to an agreement
between the White House, State Department, and the Committees, was to be used
during the hearings when discussing "solicitation or contributions for Contra aid,
or military assistance to the Contras."
69 See CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 206-209 (outlining a plan to
circumvent the Congressional reporting procedures of the Foreign Assistance Act
and the Arms Export Control Act in regard to the arms transfers to Iran).
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whose interests did not always coincide with ours; and
-An unknown number of shadowy intermediaries and financiers
who assisted with both the First and Second Iranian Channels.
7 0
In the case of Contra assistance activity, the NSC staff at least
circumvented, if not violated, Congress' explicit direction vis-A-vis its
Constitutional power to limit expenditures of government funds; when
Congressional committees sought to inquire as to the NSC staff's
activities, officials responding to their inquires misled them.7' At the
point where the Iran and Contra activities intersected operationally
- the diversion of funds from the Iran arms sales to support the
Contras - not one democratically-elected United States government
official was aware of, much less involved in, the decision making
process. Congress of course had no knowledge, since it was ignorant
of, or had been misled about the underlying activities.7 2 The Vice
President did not know,75 and the National Security Advisor did not
inform the President of this major activity. 74 The diversion - part
of a purported effort to advance the cause of democracy - was the
product of decisions made entirely by undemocratic, unelected, un-
accountable bureaucrats within the National Security Council.
"Tin Cup Diplomacy" Places United States Interests in Jeopardy
In the face of what the Administration regarded as insufficient
support in Congress for assistance to the Contras, the NSC staff
undertook to supplement Congressionally-appropriated funds, and to
replace those funds after Congress curtailed direct government fund-
ing, by seeking the assistance of foreign nations. Initially, National
Security Advisor McFarlane gave consideration to a plan for "farming
out" the entire Contra operation to a third country, which would
then be completely responsible for training and directing the forces
as well as providing funding. 75 When that nation, identified as "Coun-
try I" in the Committee report, declined the invitation to assume
such a role, overtures to the government of "Country 6" took place.7 6
70 Id. at 14.
11 Id. at 19-20.
72 Id.
71 Id. at 21.
14 Id. Admiral John Poindexter, President Reagan's National Security Advisor,
testified that he "shielded the President from knowledge of the diversion." Id.
71 Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 14 (testimony of Robert C. Mc-
Farlane, May 11, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
76 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 38.
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These discussions broke off, however, due to the coincidental public
furor over the disclosure of CIA involvement in the mining of Ni-
caraguan harbors. 77
The next approach for third country assistance to the Contras
proved much more fruitful. In May of 1984, with Congressional
appropriations about to expire and the prospects for their renewal
dim, McFarlane approached the ambassador of "Country 2," who
offered to provide the Contras with funding of $1 million per month
through the end of that year.7 1 In addition, early in 1985, "Country
2," agreed to provide an additional $24 million to the Contras. 79
The NSC staff also sought assistance from other governments. Late
in 1984, Colonel North approved of the efforts of retired Army
General John Singlaub in contacting "Countries 3 and 5" to persuade
them to provide equipment and arms. 80 In 1986, after Congress
amended the law to specifically authorize the State Department to
solicit humanitarian aid from foreign nations, 81 Assistant Secretary
of State Elliot Abrams secured an additional $10 million pledge from
Brunei's head of state (because of a transposition in the bank account
number, however, these funds never reached the Enterprise's bank
account) .82 Abrams accurately captured the demeaning nature of this
process when he described it as "tin-cup diplomacy. ' 83 Though the
perception of the United States appearing as a supplicant before other
nations, begging for the resources to pursue foreign policy goals that
it is precluded from providing itself is damaging, the ramifications
of "tin-cup diplomacy" on United States bilateral relations with other
nations extend beyond a mere problem of image. Secretary of State
Shultz recognized the pitfalls inherent in soliciting contributions from
other nations when he established the criteria for the countries from
17 Id. Duane Clarridge, Chief of the Latin American Division of the CIA Di-
rectorate of Operations, traveled to Country 6 to discuss the possibility of Country
6's assistance. Id. After being told to "hold off" on such discussions due to the
disclosure of the CIA's involvement in the mining of Nicaraguan harbor, Clarridge
wrote: "Current furor here over the Nicaraguan Project urges that we postpone
taking [Country 6] up on their offer of assistance." Id.
71 Id. at 39.
79 Id. at 45
10 Id. at 44-45.
81 Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 1986, Pub. L. 99-169, § 105, 99
Stat. 1003 (1986).
82 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 352.
Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 189 (testimony of Elliott Abrams,
June 3, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
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which humanitarian assistance might be sought, after the authori-
zation of such activity in 1985:84 Shultz "ruled out any countries
receiving U.S. aid or whose political relationship with the United
States was otherwise delicate." 5 Yet, those criteria - receipt of aid
or a "delicate" political relationship - are far too narrow as dis-
qualifying categories and fail to reflect the broad range of sensitive
dealings that the United States carries on with other nations. Inev-
itably, any contributing nation will expect some form of future ac-
commodation from the United States as a quid pro quo for having
come to the United States aid in this manner, and the mere fact of
solicitation places the United States in a subordinate position.
Congressman Jenkins raised one facet of this problem - the po-
tential impact of a foreign contribution on the domestic legislative
process - during the hearings in a colloquy with former National
Security Advisor McFarlane:
[Mr. Jenkins.] In October 1985 when the State Department was
scheduling an appointment for Colonel North to meet with one of
these countries that later contributed $2 million, I was involved in
a tough legislative battle in this House. On October 12, I believe,
of 1985, this House passed a textile bill, very controversial. At that
very time, Colonel North apparently was soliciting, from a nation
that was impacted by this bill, funds secretly and that country later
delivered $2 million, according to the testimony.
The President vetoed that bill in December 1985 and between
December 1985 and August 1986, when the Congress decided to
sustain the President by an eight-vote margin, there were entreaties
apparently made to many other nations that were impacted by this
legislation.
Now, I am pointing this out without making any allegations,
because I don't think that occurred - as I say, I am a fair person
- but as I see a nation that is severely impacted by a Congressional
bill, where the State Department is involved in lobbying against it,
and the administration, through its agents, goes to a foreign nation
that is impacted, or may be impacted and says "we need financial
help secretly," and it is delivered: Is that nation placed in a com-
promising position if that legislation is important one way or another
84 See supra note 81.
"3 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 352.
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to that country?
Mr. McFarlane. What is worse, we would be. 6
United States Foreign Policy Must Not Generate Private Profit
In turning to the "Enterprise" as a financial and supply conduit
for both the Contra and Iran operations, the NSC staff enabled
private citizens to reap significant profit from their involvement in
foreign policy initiatives of United States government. The Committee
report found that "The Enterprise took in nearly $48 million during
its first 2 years. Its income-generating capacity came almost entirely
from its access to U.S. government resources and connections: the
contributions directed to it by North, the missiles sold to Iran, and
the brokering of arms to the Contras as arranged by North." 7
During this period, the Enterprise spent almost $35.8 million (in-
cluding the funding of covert operations that were unknown to Con-
gress and occasionally to the President), leaving a surplus of around
$12.2 million. Three principals of the Enterprise - Secord, Hakim,
and Thomas Clines - "took self-determined 'commissions' from the
$12.2 million surplus to reward themselves for their work on arms
deliveries to the Contras and the CIA. The commissions totaled
approximately $4.4 million, with an average markup of about 38
percent over the cost of the arms." '8
Because the Enterprise shrouded its activities in secrecy and ran
outside the pattern of "normal" covert operations that would be
undertaken on behalf of the United States government, the govern-
ment exercised no scrutiny of any sort concerning the source of the
Enterprise's funds, how it spent its money, or the profits that private
parties derived from this government-sanctioned entity. Even Colonel
North claimed that he "did not know how Secord and Hakim actually
spent the money committed to their custody.' '89
United States Negotiators Must Represent Only United States Interests
Possibly nowhere in the Iran-Contra affair did events diverge more
dramatically from traditional patterns of foreign policy than in the
practice of placing private citizens, each with a potential personal
86 Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 279-80 (testimony of Robert C.
McFarlane, May 14, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
17 CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 331.
88 Id.
" Id. at 9.
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financial stake in the outcome, in the position of negotiating the
United States interests with representatives of a foreign nation. In
October of 1986, United States representatives met with the relative
of a leading Iranian official in Frankfurt, Germany, as part of the
effort to open the "Second Channel" to the leadership structure in
Iran. The United States contingent consisted of Colonel North, Se-
cord, Hakim, and a former CIA official. North presented a nego-
tiating position of seven points which he said the President had
approved; these included provisions for delivery to Iran of weapons,
weapons parts, and medical supplies, the release of all American
hostages, and the return of the body of an American who had died
in captivity.9
One by one, the American delegation departed, leaving Hakim as
the sole United States negotiator with the Iranian representatives.
The agreement that he reached with the Iranians, which came to be
known as the "Hakim Accords," differed markedly from the earlier
seven-point United States negotiating position. The nine-point "Ha-
kim accords" provided for the release of only "1-1/2 American
hostages" ("1 definitely and the 2nd with all effective possible effort" 91)
rather than all of them; the agreement would have committed the
United States to provide Iran with updated military intelligence, and
also would have provided Iran with technical support and prices for
other weapons.92
One of the most serious concessions of the "Hakim Accords," as
compared to the previous seven-point United States position, involved
the injection of the "Da'Wa Prisoners" into the negotiations. The
Da'Wa were 17 terrorists convicted in Kuwait for crimes including
the bombing of the United States Embassy in that country. Kuwait
had resisted pressure from Iran for the release of the Da'Wa, and
the United States had supported that resolve, urging other countries
to follow Kuwait's example. The United States policy was clear:
"Terrorists should be punished-not freed, as the Iranians were now
asking." 93 Nevertheless, the "Hakim Accords" contained a provision
under which a plan would be drawn up for the release of the Da'Wa. 94
90 Id. at 257-58.
9, Id. at 257 (library of Congress translation of original Farsi version of "Hakim
Accords").
92 Id.
93 Id. at 240.
- Id. at 257.
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Irrespective of the national interest, Albert Hakim, the individual
who found himself in the position of negotiating with the Iranians
on behalf of the United States, possessed an intense personal interest
in keeping channels of communication open with Iran. First and last,
Hakim was a businessman: he sought a major segment of the Iranian
foreign trade business in some future period of better relations be-
tween that nation and the United States. Hakim saw the Iranian
market as "providing spectacular opportunities for wealth. He tes-
tified that he hoped to obtain for Secord and himself at least a 3
percent share of the annual $15 billion Iranian market if commercial
relations with the United States could be renewed. . . . Hakim was
not only promoting a solution to the impasse over the hostages, but
also pursuing his and Secord's own commercial interests." 95
Despite this clear conflict, the NSC staff allowed Hakim to assume
a role which at the very least cloaked him with the apparent authority
to negotiate on behalf of the United States with representatives of
Iran, a country with which the United States hoped to establish a
more trusting relationship. 96 Again, going outside the traditional chan-
nels of foreign policy operations produced results which proved to
be at the very least damaging and could easily have been catastrophic.
Congress's Power of the Purse Must be Preserved
One of the most unambiguous powers granted to the legislative
branch under our Constitution appears in its "Appropriations Clause":
"No money may be drawn from the Treasury, but in consequence
of appropriations made by law." ' 97 This provision sought to ensure
that the elected representatives of the people would retain control
over any activity of the executive branch requiring the expenditure
of funds. 98
91 Id. at 350.
The degree of Hakim's actual authority with the "Second Channel" represen-
tatives, and of United States officials' knowledge and approval of Hakim's activities,
is a matter of conjecture and dispute. He testified that he learned from North that
the President approved the plan, id. at 257, and Admiral Poindexter testified that
the President approved the plan, id. at 9. But Secretary of State Shultz testified
that when he told the President of the portion of the plan concerning the Da'Wa
prisoners after first learning of it in December of 1986, the President gave no
indication he had any previous knowledge of negotiations involving the Da'Wa and
"reacted like he had been kicked in the belly", id. at 263.
9' U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7.
" CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 412.
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The NSC staff, however, structured the activities of the Iran-Contra
affair precisely to avoid this democratic check. Moreover, those in-
volved in the Iran-Contra affair contemplated that this extra-gov-
ernmental structure would be available for use in other future
applications. In his testimony, Colonel North suggested that the
"Enterprise" that handled the financial aspects of the Iran-Contra
affair grew out of a goal of the late CIA Director Casey to establish
a permanent entity outside the bounds of government "capable of
conducting operations or activities of assistance to U.S. foreign policy
goals." 99 This entity, he said, would be "self-financing, independent
of appropriated monies and capable of conducting activities similar
to the ones we had conducted here."' ° No clearer challenge to the
legislative branch's power of the purse could be imagined than the
creation of an operational covert foreign policy apparatus expressly
designed to be "independent of appropriated monies."
VI. CONCLUSION
The revelation of the activities of the National Security Council
staff in the Iran-Contra affair demonstrates how radically this entity
has evolved over the past four decades. The NSC, originally intended
as an advisory and coordinating body to synthesize the positions of
others and oversee the execution of policy, became the initiator of
policy and then the operational executor as well.
In Harry Truman's White House, the "briefcase-carriers" - second
and third-tier bureaucrats - were restricted from participation in
NSC meetings as a means of encouraging high-level discussions of
national security policy.'01 In the Iran-Contra affair, the latter-day
counterparts of the "briefcase-carriers" came to assume control not
only over the formulation of such policy, but its implementation as
well. In the process, the essential idea underlying the creation of the
National Security Council itself - to provide a mechanism by which
officials at the highest level of the executive branch could bring their
experience and institutional concerns to bear on questions of national
security - was completely subverted. The process, intended as an
instrument for inclusion of a range of views, became instead a means
of their exclusion. This action resulted in the shipment of arms without
Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 314 (testimony of Oliver L. North,
July 10, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
100 Id.
10, See D. ACHESON, supra note 33.
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the knowledge of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, diplomatic negotiations
being conducted without the knowledge of the Secretary of State,
and advice on the direction of military action in Central America
being given without the knowledge of the Secretary of Defense.
Further, all of this took place without the knowledge of the legislative
branch.
Shortly after the Tower Commission submitted its report on the
Iran-Contra affair, the President took steps to correct some of the
more obvious defects in NSC operations that had been exposed by
the affair. In a message to Congress, 0 2 the President transmitted the
text of a National Security Decision Directive'03 (NSDD) he had issued
to implement the Commission's recommendations. The NSDD des-
ignates the NSC as "the principal forum for consideration of national
security policy issues requiring presidential decision,"'04 and specifies
that Cabinet-level officials including the Secretary of State, Secretary
of Defense, and Director of Central Intelligence would be the Pres-
ident's "principal advisors" on matters within the jurisdiction of their
respective departments. 05 In addition, the NSDD delineates the duties
of the National Security Advisor and requires the Advisor to "present
his own views and advice and, at the same time, faithfully represent
the views of other NSC participants." '0 Other provisions of the
NSDD formalize procedures for NSC meetings and call for a review
of the interagency decisionmaking process. 0 7 The section of the NSDD
titled "Covert Activities and Non-Government Personnel" requires
coordination of proposed covert actions with members of the NSC,
including the Attorney General, and the transmittal of their recom-
mendations to the President. The directive mandates that "the NSC
'02 MESSAGE FROM THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES TRANSMITTING THE TEXT
OF THE DECISION DIRECTIVE ISSUED TO IMPLEMENT THE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE
SPECIAL REVIEW BOARD, H.R. Doc. No. 58, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter
cited as PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE].
"I National Security Decision Directive 266 (March 31, 1987), reprinted in PRES-
IDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 102.
1o4 Id. at 4.
os Id. at 4-5.
106 Id. at 6.
107 Id. at 8-9. "The NSC, through the National Security Advisor, shall review the
structure of senior interagency groups and regional and functional interagency groups
established pursuant to, or under the authority of Presidential directives or applicable
memoranda, and shall recommend all such changes thereto as may be necessary or
desirable to realize fully and promptly in practice the Special Review Board's rec-
ommended model for the NSC system, as well as all of the Board's other recom-
mendations." Id.
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staff itself will not undertake the conduct of covert activities;" and
directs that the use of private parties in the conduct of covert activities
be tightly limited and closely supervised.'0
In his message, the President reiterated the Tower Commission's
recommendation that no legislative changes be made in the NSC's
structure, and he noted that the Council's "flexibility is an important
part of its usefulness." ,09 The President endorsed only one substantive
structural change in the NSC apparatus, a change internal to the
legislative branch: merger of the existing separate Intelligence Com-
mittees of the Senate and House into a single Joint Committee.110
While the content of the NSDD responds to many of the recom-
mendations for changes in the National Security Council's operations
put forward by the Tower Commission, it fails to allay the concerns
of many observers that the "flexibility" in the NSC structure and
operations, cited by the President as a virtue, could in the future
again be used to produce the damaging consequences of the Iran-
Contra affair. In addition, the NSDD's prescriptions and prohibitions
are by their nature impermanent and alterable at will, as Assistant
Attorney General Charles J. Cooper noted in discussing a different
NSDD in testimony before the Congressional committees, such di-
rectives lack the force and effect of law. Cooper stated that "the
NSDD is an internal intrabranch directive and obviously the President
can deviate from requirements that he places upon himself."", Like-
wise, any President - current or future - would be free to order
his subordinates in the executive branch to deviate from the speci-
"fications and limitations on NSC operations in NSDD 266.
Accordingly, a number of proposals have been advanced to render
changes in the NSC structure and operations in more permanent,
legislative form. One such proposal, to make the National Security
Advisor to the President subject to Senate confirmation, is intended
to place that individual under scrutiny at the beginning of his or her
term and to make him or her available for questioning by the leg-
islative branch thereafter." 2 As the Tower Commission noted, how-
ever, the NSC Advisor should answer only to the President:
101 Id. at 9.
'09 PRESIDENTIAL MESSAGE, supra note 102, at 1.
HO Id. at 1-2.
H- Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 316 (testimony of Charles J. Cooper,
June 25, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
HI See R. CELADA, NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR: ACCOUNTABIUTY TO CONGRESS
CRS-9-CRS-12 (Congressional Research Service No. 86-1025-A, (1986)).
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"[C]onfirmation is inconsistent with the role the National Security
Advisor should play. He should not decide, only advise .... He
should serve the President, with no collateral and potentially diverting
loyalties.""'1
A more focused approach to counter the specific abuses uncovered
by the Iran-Contra affair is to entirely remove the NSC and its staff
from an operational role. The Congressional committees made such
a recommendation, stating, "[t]he Committees recommend that the
members and staff of the NSC not engage in covert actions. By
statute the NSC was created to provide advice to the President on
national security matters. But there is no express statutory prohibition
on the NSC engaging in operational intelligence activities. 1 1 4 The
Tower Commission also gave inferential support to such a proposal:
while recommending that "no substantive change be made in the
provisions of the National Security Act dealing with the structure
and operation of the NSC system," the Commission stated that the
National Security Advisor "should not decide, only advise. He should
not engage in policy implementation or operations.""' 5
A bill introduced by Congressman Charles Bennett early in 1987116
would require that "[n]either the Council nor the staff of the Council
(including any individual member of that staff) may conduct any
operational activities, whether covert or overt." '" 7 In addition, Con-
gressman Jack Brooks, a member of the House Select Committee,
introduced legislation to repeal the statutory authority under which
the NSC staff engaged in operational activities. The Brooks bill'
would remove the catch-all clause of the National Security Act of
1947 authorizing the NSC to carry out "such other functions as the
President may direct" 1 9 - thereby effectively limiting it to the role
of advice and coordination originally envisioned by its drafters.
While such legislative efforts to redirect and channel the activities
of the NSC would have a more permanent effect than a directive
issued unilaterally by the President, correcting the problems exposed
by the Iran-Contra affair is a question of whether Presidential lead-
Tower Report, supra note 9, at V-5.
CONGRESSIONAL REPORT, supra note 12, at 425.
11 Tower Report, supra note 9, at V-5.
116 H.R. 70, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
117 Id.
.' H.R. 3652, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
19 National Security Act of 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-253, § 101(b), 61 Stat. 495
(1947) (presently codified at 50 U.S.C. § 402(b) (1982)).
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ership is exerted in foreign policy formulation and execution. As the
Tower Commission noted, "[tihe National Security Council is only
advisory. It is the President alone who decides.' °20 It is the President
therefore who must determine the degree to which he will consult
with and rely on the advice of his Cabinet-level officers on matters
of national security. It is the President who must establish and
maintain a working relationship with the Congress in the national
security area. And it is the President who must be in a position to
correct any subordinate who is under the misapprehension, as was
Admiral Poindexter, that the buck stops on the NSC Advisor's desk
rather than the President's. 12 1
120 Tower Report, supra note 9, at V-2.
2I Congressional Hearings, supra note 52, at 38 (testimony of John M. Poindexter,
July 15, 1987) (presently available only in galley form).
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The 1988 Dean Rusk Award
The Dean Rusk Award, named in honor of Professor Dean Rusk,
Sibley Professor of Law at the University of Georgia, is given each year
to the student author of the most outstanding international or comparative
law paper' submitted. The competition, sponsored by the Georgia Society
of International Law, is open to all students currently enrolled in ac-
credited Georgia law schools. The Georgia Journal of International and
Comparative Law congratulates the winner of the Eleventh Annual Dean
Rusk Award, Nathan G. Knight, Jr. of the University of Georgia School
of Law, and is pleased to present his paper, Section 337 and the GA TT:
A Necessary Protection or an Unfair Trade Practice?
Both the Georgia Society and the Georgia Journal wish to extend their
gratitude to this year's esteemed Dean Rusk Award judges: Thomas M.
Buergenthal, I. T. Cohen Professor of Human Rights, Emory Universi-
ty School of Law; Bertis E. Downs, IV, Legal Writing Instructor, Univer-
sity of Georgia School of Law; Thomas Harrold, Partner, Glass,
McCullough, Sherrill & Harrold, Atlanta, Georgia; and Louis B. Sohn,
Woodruff Professor of International Law, University of Georgia School
of Law.
